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NOTES AND COMMENTS
federal provisions but extending to a defendant who offers a counter-
claim.3 4  With the enactment of such a rule, it is conceivable that a
greater volume of out-of-court settlements without the necessity for trial
would be possible and, in those cases where trial might still be required,
the issues could be narrowed with the facts being impartially presented
for speedy decision.8 5
H. R. WINTON, JR.
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MUNICIPAL
FLUORIDATION OF WATER
It has been some eleven years since artificial fluoridation of water was
first utilized in any municipality in this country' but the extent of the
progress made in the use of this method for combatting tooth decay may
be seen in the fact that, according to a recent report, there are now 1,437
communities with a combined population of more than thirty million
people using artificially fluoridated water. 2 During the ensuing years there
has been a goodly amount of scientic and political as well as legal argu-
ment both for and against fluoridation. The scientific history of the sub-
ject has been well documented3 and the general press has covered the
political developments. It is the purpose of this note, therefore, to dis-
cuss the legal problems which have been raised, to point out how they
have been resolved elsewhere, and to consider how such legal problems
might be treated by an Illinois court.
Opinions have been published passing upon the legality of fluoridation
programs in seven jurisdictions to date with the United States Supreme
Court denying certiorari in four instances,' and at least one other case
34 See, in that connection, the case of Beach v. Beach, 114 F. (2d) 479 (1940).
35 If more should be needed, particularly in relation to the matter of obtaining
impartial medical testimony, attention should be given to an experiment developed
in New York and described in Marlen and Wright, Impartial Medical Testimony
(The Macmillan Co., New York, 1956).
1 The first pilot study of a national research program was set up in 1945 at
Grand Rapids, Michigan, according to Heustis, "Working Together To Save Teeth
in Michigan," 32 Today's Health 13 (1954).
2 Newsweek, March 18, 1957, p. 112.
3 The sources are collected in Report No. 140, entitled "Fluoridation of Municipal
Water Supply-A Review of the Scientific and Legal Aspects," Charles S. Rhyne
and Eugene F. Mullin, Jr., Issued by the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, Washington, D. C., 1952. See also note in 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 343.
4DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98 (1953), cert. den.
374 U. S. 1012, 74 S. Ct. 863, 98 L. Ed. 1135 (1954) ; Chapman v. City of Shreveport,
225 La. 859, 74 So. (2d) 142 (1954), app. dis. 348 U. S. 892, 75 S. Ct. 216, 99 L. Ed.
701 (1954) ; Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. (2d) 609 (1955),
app. dis. 351 U. S. 935, 76 S. Ct. 833, 100 L. Ed. 1463 (1956); Dowell v. City of
Tulsa,-Okla.-, 273 P. (2d) 859 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 912, 75 S. Ct. 292, 99
L. Ed. 715 (1955) ; Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, 292 P. (2d) 134 (1956) ;
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is now pending in still another state.5 All of the published cases which
have been carried to final decision have found in favor of the legality of
fluoridation and each decision, subsequent to the first, has quoted from
and utilized, as authority, the prior determinations. In addition, it would
appear that courts at the trial level in at least three other states have also
sustained the validity of the fluoridation ordinances there exposed to
attack. 6
Opponents of fluoridation have relied upon four basic arguments. The
first contention has been that the enactment of a fluoridation ordinance
exceeds the power of the municipality but the courts have found little
difficulty in holding the fluoridation of drinking water to be an appro-
priate exercise of the police power in order to promote public health. In
Chapman v. City of Shreveport7 for example, the court answered a trial
judge's conclusion that fluoridation of water was not an exercise of the
police power by saying that the health and physical well-being of the
children of the community was a matter "of great concern to all people,
and any legislation to retard or reduce disease in their midst cannot and
should not be opposed on the ground that it has no reasonable relation to
the general health and welfare."'' The authority to exercise the police
power depends, of course, on local law, so where the courts have not found
sufficient power granted in municipal charters they have looked to state
legislation setting up state boards of health or establishing boards of in-
spection and standards.
The second argument has been that state laws relating to the practice
of medicine, dentistry or pharmacy, as well as state and federal pure food
and drug laws, have been violated by such ordinances. The first part of
this argument was neatly disposed of by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
in the case of Dowell v. City of TulsaO where the court pointed out that
the city was "no more practicing medicine or dentistry or manufacturing,
Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. (2d) 616, 277 P. (2d) 352 (1954) ; Froncek v.
City of Milwaukee, 269 Wis. 276, 69 N. W. (2d) 242 (1955). See also McQuillan,
The Law of Municipal Corporations (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1949), 3d Ed.,
1956 Cumin. Supp. § 24.265.
5 Teeter v. City of LaPorte,-Ind.-, 139 N. E. (2d) 157 (1957), wherein an order
sustaining a demurrer was overruled and the cause was remanded for further
proceedings.
6 A report by the Subcommittee on Health of the City Council of Chicago, dated
April 30, 1954, at p. 10, refers to holdings in McFarlan and Hoffman v. Mayor and
City of Baltimore (Md., 1952); Hampshire v. Gard (Sup. Ct., Hampton County,
Mass., 1952), noted in 1 Kans. L. Rev. 160; and McGurren v. City of Fargo
(N. D., 1952).
7225 La. 859, 74 So. (2d) 142 (1954).
8225 La. 859 at 870, 74 So. (2d) 142 at 145.
9--Okla.-, 273 P. (2d) 859 (1954).
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preparing, compounding or selling a drug, than a mother would be who
furnishes her children a well balanced diet, including foods containing
vitamin D and calcium to harden bones and prevent rickets, or lean meat
and milk to prevent pellagra." 1 The purported violation of state pure
food laws has been answered by finding the presence of some state author-
ity which inspects and approves the drinking water supply, thereby ap-
parently removing fluoridated water from the operation of these laws.11
Any alleged theory that a violation of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act would occur has been repudiated by the agency charged with the en-
forcement of that statute.
12
The third argument proceeds on the basis that fluoridation ordinances
violate Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution in that they represent an unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive and
discriminatory exercise of the police power. It has been contended, spe-
cifically, that fluoridation violates the right of the individual to protect his
health as he sees fit. That argument might be said to be met by the doc-
trine stated in the case of Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,13
a leading case in relation to the public health police power of a state over
an individual. The defendant there, who had been convicted for refusal
to be vaccinated pursuant to a compulsory vaccination law, argued that
the state's action was unreasonable because respectable medical opinion
opposed it; because vaccination would have a harmful effect on the minor-
ity of the population; would not effect all groups equally; and would in-
troduce harmful germs into the bodies of the people. The court neverthe-
less upheld the statute, stating: "Upon the principle of self-defense, of
paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against
an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members . . . The
liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person
within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to
be, at all times, and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. "14
Arguments offered by fluoridation opponents could be said to be anal-
ogous to the one just suggested but subsequent decisions which have up-
held chlorination of water,15 the exclusion from public schools of unvac-
10-Okla.-at-. 273 P. (2d) 859 at 864.
11 The cases of DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98 (1953),
and Dowell v. City of Tulsa,-Okla.-, 273 P. (2d) 859 (1954), appear to have
disposed of the problem on the basis of local law.
12 See Report No. 140, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, referred to
in note 3, ante., particularly pp. 41-7.
18 197 U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905).
14 197 U. S. 11 at 26-7, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 at 650.
15 Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 52 N. E. (2d) 566 (1943).
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cinated pupils,' 6 compulsory x-rays for students of a state university, 17
and compulsory blood tests for handlers of certain types of foods'8 have
provided further refutation for these arguments. For this reason, the op-
ponents of fluoridation have been forced to attempt to distinguish their
situation from the ones found in these cases.
An example of such an attempt, and the answer thereto, may be found
in the case of Kraus v. City of Clevela'nd. 9 The court there noted that the
plaintiff, while admitting that personal liberties were not wholly free from
restraint, contended that, for a valid exercise of the police power on the
basis of public health, the subject matter of the regulation had to relate
to a contagious or infectious disease, and that there had to be an overriding
necessity. By way of reply in regard to this, the court said that it was
"sufficient to say there is no foundation in law for such a premise. An
examination shows that laws relating to child labor, minimum wages for
women and minors have all been upheld on the basis of the police power
in relation to public health. Regulations relating to control of venereal
disease, blood tests for marriage licenses, sterilization, pasteurization of
milk, chlorination of water and vaccination have all been held valid as
based on police power exercised in regard to public health."
20
Courts of review, thus far, unanimously held that fluoridation bears
a reasonable relation to the goal of reducing dental caries. The object
being considered to be a legitimate one, it would follow therefrom that no
violation of any right of liberty would be present in an ordinance of this
character.
The fourth contention arises from the claim that guarantees with re-
spect to religious freedom, incorporated in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, are violated by the fluoridation process. It has been argued
that if a minority is forced to submit to medication with drugs, the minor-
ity would be compelled to indulge in a practice prohibited by its religious
beliefs. Admitting that religious freedom is not absolute in character, the
opponents of fluoridation insist that this freedom can be validly abridged
only where a clear and present danger to the community can be found
present. They would distinguish the practice of chlorinating water on the
ground that the medicinal effect thereof is spent in killing bacteria in the
water whereas the process of fluoridation treats the person of the consumer
directly. No clear and present danger could be said to exist, they say,
16 Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 192 (1922).
17 State v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. (2d) 860, 239 P. (2d) 545 (1952).
18 Ex parte Vaughan, 93 Tex. 112, 246 S. W. 373 (1922).
19163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. (2d) 609 (1955).
20 163 Ohio St. 559 at 562, 127 N. E. (2d) 609 at 611.
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because the matter of dental caries is not a form of communicable com-
plaint.
Despite this, the courts have held that fluoridation regulates not re-
ligious belief but conduct and, as such, does not derogate against freedom
of religion. 21 These courts find no difference in the purported distinction
between chlorination and fluoridation 22 and one of the latest decisions on
the subject discusses the "clear and present" danger argument by saying
that the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth "has
not rendered the states and their political subdivisions impotent to enact
reasonable laws for the protection of the public health ... The 'clear and
present danger' . . . in this case ... is a children's disease of serious pro-
portions. "23
What then of fluoridation in Illinois ? Certainly the practice of fluori-
dating water is not a novelty here for the City of Evanston, in 1947, be-
came one of the first in the nation to add fluorides to the drinking water
supplied its residents. 24 For that matter, the City of Chicago is, at pres-
ent,25 the largest city in the country to adopt this health measure, having
enacted an ordinance on the point as early as 1954 with operation there-
under becoming effective about a year ago. 26 It does not appear that, to
date, any case designed to test the validity of fluoridation legislation has
been commenced in Illinois. However, given the legislative power con-
cerning public health which has already been delegated to municipalities
in the state, the prior interpretations placed on this power by the Illinois
Supreme Court, and such authority as is afforded by the cases decided
before high courts in other states, there would seem to be little doubt as
21 See, for purpose of the distinction between belief and conduct, the cases of
Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U. S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944) ; Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) : Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11. 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905) ; Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1879).
22 The opinion in Dowell v. City of Tulsa,-Okla-at-, 273 P. (2d) 859 at 863
(1954), for example, states: "To us it seems ridiculous and of no consequence in
considering the public health phase of the case that the substance to be added to
the water may be classed as a mineral rather than a drug, antiseptic or germ killer;
just as it is of little, if any, consequence whether fluoridation accomplishes its
beneficial result to the public health by killing germs in the water or by hardening
the teeth or building up immunity in them to the bacteria that causes caries or
tooth decay."
23 Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221 at 234, 292 P. (2d) 134 at 140 (1956).
24 Report of Subcommittee on Health of the City Council of Chicago, dated April
25 The New York Times Magazine, under date of March 3, 1957, at p. 15, contains
an elightening discussion of the current political debate with respect to fluorida-
tion for New York City.
26 The ordinance appears in Council Journal, Chicago, June 16, 1954, pp. 7713-14.
The delay in putting the ordinance into operation arose from the necessity of
installing essential equipment to make the process effective.
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to what the holding of an Illinois court should be in the event such a case
were to be brought.
In the first place, all Illinois municipalities are, by statute, authorized
to do "all acts and make all regulations, which may be necessary or ex-
pedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease."
27  If
consideration is given to the fact that any fluoridation program is intended
to promote the health of the inhabitants of a given community, whether
done by the suppression of disease or otherwise, the essential predicate for
any ordinance would seem to be clearly present. Even if it were not so
obvious, the Illinois Supreme Court, when constructing this statute, has
often referred to the fact that, as the most important police power of the
municipality is that of caring for the safety and health of the community,
all ordinances for that purpose should be liberally construed.
28
Of significance in that connection is the 1944 holding of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz2 9 wherein the
validity of an ordinance based on the police power relating to public
health was challenged on the ground that it violated not only the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution but also Section 2 of
Article II of the state constitution. In essence, the ordinance there con-
cerned authorized a judge, having a person before him on a criminal
charge, to order the person detained without bond and referred to a hos-
pital director or other designated authority when, in the judge's opinion,
the person might be believed to have a communicable venereal disease.
The criminal charge was one for prostitution and the defendant, after
refusal to submit to a physical examination, was ordered confined. The
case came up as an original action for a writ of habeas corpus which was
denied when the court upheld the validity of the ordinance, saying that it
had "almost universally been held in this country that constitutional guar-
antees must yield to the enforcement of the statutes and ordinances de-
signed to promote the public health as a part of the police powers of the
State. "30
It would appear, therefore, that the Illinois Supreme Court should
have no greater difficulty than other high courts have experienced when
ruling on the fluoridation question at least with respect to a finding that
any distinction between contagious diseases and the problem presented by
dental caries was an immaterial one, particularly since the deprivation of
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23-81.
28 See, for exabple, Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N. E. 182 (1917).
29 386 Ill. 360, 54 N. E. (2d) 441 (1944).
80386 Ill. 360 at 365, 54 N. E. (2d) 441 at 443.
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liberty caused by fluoridation would be one much smaller than that in-
volved in the cited case.
It is true that, in the later case of Ambassador East, Inc. v. City of
Chicago,31 the court held that, in addition to being reasonable in character,
a health ordinance had to rest on the ground that it was a "necessary
means of preserving the public health" but, as concerns fluoridation, there
would seem to be ample authority in the decided cases for finding the pres-
ence of such reasonable regulation. In fact, according to scientific report,
the method provides not only an effective but some would insist the only
effective method for achieving the desired end. It would appear, there-
fore, that those who would contest fluoridation in Illinois would be unlikely
to do so successfully on legal grounds, hence would be obliged to restrict
their arguments to the arenas of science and politics.
C. R. PARKER
31399 Ill. 359, 77 N. E. (2d) 803 (1948). In that case, an ordinance purporting
to regulate hotel rates was said not to be supported by the health power as the
possible result of increased hotel rates upon the public health was considered to be
too remote to show a reasonable causal connection between the ordinance and the
conservation of public health.
